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1. Objective and research question 
The main objective of this analysis is to quantify the underlying structure of the climate, socioeconomic 
and conflict system. Understanding how the three main themes (climate, conflict and socioeconomic) 
are connected, is key to defining intervention and mitigating conflict. The main research question we 
aim to address is: What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict, and socio-economic system 
in Nigeria? 
 
2. Methods and data 
Using network analysis, a statistical model is built to quantitatively display the connections between 
several variables pertaining to climate variabilities, security threats and socioeconomic risks, in order 
to identify the underlying structure of this complex system of relationships.  
Climate variables were compiled using Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data 
(CHIRPS) data. Conflict data were gathered from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED). Data on socioeconomic vulnerabilities were collected from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS).  
3. Results 
What is the underlying structure of the climate, conflict and socio-economic system? 
Nigeria faces rising temperatures and rainfall variability. Drought and desertification threaten the arid 
and semi-arid regions of Nigeria while other parts of the country face torrential rains [1]. This climate 
related fragility results in major agricultural and livelihood impacts. Other than climate variability, 
Nigeria has historically experienced violence involving government repression, ethnic and religious 
groups, as well as militant and security forces [2]. Furthermore, Nigeria’s Islamic group Boko Haram 
is fighting to overthrow the government and create an Islamic state [2]. Nigeria’s landscape of conflict 
risks is therefore highly complex and involves an interplay of climate fragility, socio-politics, inequality 
and insecurity.   
Among 38 variables, the network model retained 27 variables. Each category of variables is represented 
in the network model (different colours), suggesting the relevance of many sectors of the socioeconomic 
landscape to the climate-conflict nexus, for Nigeria (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between climate, conflict and socio-economic risks as a network model for the 
Nigeria case. The width of each edge corresponds to the strength of the relationship between each pair 
of variables. 
 
Climate change is recognized as a threat multiplier due to its role in exacerbating the traditional cause 
of conflict [3]. One of the most common forms of threat multiplication is when climate alters the 
competition over increasingly scarce resources. The Lake Chad Basin in Nigeria is one such resource. 
Mass amounts of the population compete over this dramatically shrinking water source [4]. In these 
areas’ displacement, hunger and malnutrition are rife [4]. If we look at the network structure, we can 
see strong linkages between climate (node 26, 27) and employment (node 18). The president Buhari 
of Chad stated "The 'oasis in the desert' is just a desert now... Farmers and herdsmen struggle over the 
little water left; Herdsmen migrate in search of greener pastures resulting in conflicts; Our youths are 
joining terrorist groups because of lack of jobs and difficult economic conditions.". Indeed, in 
populations where a main form of livelihood is through farming and fishing, increasing aridity has left 
people jobless and vulnerable to recruitment by Boko Haram [5]. Climate (node 26,17) and 
employment (node 18) become strongly linked and in turn contribute to this climate conflict nexus.  
These aspects and their resultant impacts are demonstrated through a variety of indicators in the 
network. Boko Haram has highly impacted the education system of Nigeria [2,5]. In terms of knock-
on effects, we see how uneducated men and woman (node 14, 16) are strongly linked to nutritional 
insecurities such as the number of malnourished and underweight children (node 8, 10) which are in 
turn connected to inequality (node 2). The effects of Boko Haram within Nigeria are a complex 
interplay therefore of employment and education driven by militant groups and exacerbated by 
climate resulting in nutritional insecurity, poverty and inequality and in turn furthering conflict in 
the country.  
Other than through employment the network also shows direct relationships between climate (node 
24,27) and conflict (node 20). Indeed, in other areas of Nigeria there are other driving factors between 
climate and conflict outbreaks. As Nigeria is vulnerable to extreme weather events, we can see 
climate (node 23, 24) worsening existing levels of poverty (node 9, 10), evidently the poorest 
communities are often those that are the most vulnerable to climate change. Furthermore, the level of 
wealth in a system (node 1) also determines inequalities which may enhance both grievances and 
resentment among the relatively deprived and thus facilitate mobilization for conflict (node 22). 
Annex Methods and data 
We use a regularized partial correlation network [6], as part of Markov random fields, to model the 
climate-socioeconomic-conflict relationships. A network is a graphical representation of the 
relationships (edges) between different entities (nodes). The variables, represented by the nodes, are 
categorized as (a) climate variables, (b) conflict variables, and (c) socioeconomic risk variables which 
are further grouped into (c.1) poverty and inequality risk variables, (c.2) nutritional insecurity variables, 
and (c.3) employment and education variables. The edges between nodes, representing the partial 
correlation coefficients encode the remaining statistical association between two variables after 
controlling for all other information possible (conditional independence associations). These partial 
correlation coefficients were estimated from a matrix of Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients for 
continuous variables. Polychoric correlations were used for categorical variables, polyserial and biserial 
correlations used between variables of different types. To eliminate non-significant relationships, the 
partial correlation network was regularized using a Lasso regularization [7] with an EBIC model 
selection [8]. 
Climate variables were compiled using Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station data 
(CHIRPS) data [9]. Conflict data were gathered from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project 
(ACLED). Data on socioeconomic vulnerabilities were collected from the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS). 
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